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WHEN NONUSE IS USEFUL: BANKRUPTCY LAW
IN POST-COMMUNIST CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Michael Kim
INTRODUCTION
From the death of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe
("CEE")' arose the difficult task of developing market-based econo-
mies.2 CEE nations faced a Communist legacy that posed the antithe-
sis of a market economy. Prior to 1989, Communist ideology had
dictated the social and economic policy of CEE nations, stressing a
centralized government and socio-economic collectivism. 3 Under
Communism, the government owned all assets and planned the ac-
tions of most economic actors, such as banks, enterprise managers,
and labor.' Through centralized control, the state ensured an artifi-
cially stable economy: the state controlled the allocation of invest-
ment, credit, and wages, 5 investing in and subsidizing banks and
enterprises, even when they were not making profits; 6 and the state
1. 1 Jonathan R. Macey & Enrico Colombatto, Public Choice Theory and the
Transition Market Economy in Eastern Europe: Currency Convertibility and Er-
change Rates, 28 Cornell Int'l LJ. 387, 387 (1995) (hereinafter Macey & Colombatto,
Public Choice]. Although the term "Central and Eastern Europe" covers Hungary,
Poland, the former Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, the former Yugosla-
via, and the former Soviet Union, this Note will focus on Hungary and the Czech
Republic.
2. William C. Philbrick, The Task of Regulating Investment Funds in the Formerly
Centrally Planned Economies, 8 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 539, 539 (1994) [hereinafter Phil-
brick, The Task of Regulating]; see Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Institu-
tional Reform in Eastern Europe: Evolution or Design?, 1992 B.Y.U. L Rev. 1, 5-14
[hereinafter Frydman & Rapaczynski, Institutional Reform]. A market-based econ-
omy is "any economic system based on private ownership of all factors of production
in which owners of capital act as entrepreneurs and coordinate their activity through
use of the market." Carolyn Brzezinski, Competition and Antitrust Law in Central
Europe: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, 15 Mich. J. Int'l L 1129,
1129 n.1 (1994).
3. Macey & Colombatto, supra note 1, at 388; Sheila M. Puffer & Daniel J. Mc-
Carthy, Finding the Common Ground in Russian and American Business Ethics, Cal.
Mgmt. Rev., Vol. 37, No. 2, Jan. 1995, at 29, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS
file, at *4. In Communist CEE, two types of centrally planned economies existed: the
first controlled the quantity of production with fixed prices and market, evincing little
regard for reforms to increase overall productive efficiency, e.g., Bulgaria and
Romania; the second made attempts at limited reform to allow some market economy
concepts to guide economic decisions, e.g., Hungary and the former Czechoslavia.
Macey & Colombatto, Public Choice, supra note 1, at 388; see Michele Balfour &
Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, 17
Fordham Int'l LJ. 84, 87 n.5 (1993).
4. See Frydman & Rapaczynski, Institutional Reform, supra note 2, at 2 ("Eastern
Europe has a very specific industrial infrastructure, a product of a command econ-
omy."); Macey & Colombatto, Public Choice, supra note 1, at 388.
5. BrzezinskL supra note 2, at 1130.
6. Fred Luthans et al., Doing Business in Central and Eastern Europe: Political,
Economic, and Cultural Diversity, Bus. Horizons, Vol. 38, No. 5, Sept. 1995, at 9,
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further distorted the statistics of the "financial health" of the econ-
omy.7 The "consistent" economy provided socio-economic stability8
and instilled such expectations in banks and state-owned enterprises 9
("SOEs"), as well as the general public." Two results of this planned
economy were the absence of bankruptcies and full employment."
Consequently, economic actors living under Communism were not
financially disciplined, but were indifferent about profits or economic
success.' 2 Investment decisions in the state sector were not driven by
profit-motive.' 3 Under Communism, people ignored basic market
principles, such as profit-maximization, and were insulated from com-
petition;14 therefore, there was no need for basic market mechanisms,
such as bankruptcy laws' 5 or competition laws.' 6
After the end of Communism, the CEE nations scrambled to begin
their socio-economic transition toward market economies.'7 Hence,
the CEE transition economy was born. By its very definition, the
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *5; Alisa Yamnarm, Note, The Cri-
sis of Unemployment and the Future of Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Hun-
gary as a Model, 3 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 181, 189-90 (1995).
7. See, e.g., Steve Campbell, Comment, Brother, Can You Spare a Ruble? The
Development of Bankruptcy Legislation in the New Russia, 10 Bankr. Dev. J. 343,354-
55 (1994) (noting the former Soviet Russian practice of supporting inefficient firms).
8. Ronald Daniels & Robert Howse, Reforming the Reform Process: A Critique
of Prosposals for Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, 25 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. &
Pol. 27, 67 (1992); see Luthans et al., supra note 6, at *5; see also Frydman &
Rapaczynski, Institutional Reform, supra note 2, at 15 (commenting on the "long tra-
dition of government paternalism").
9. Paul Marer, Transformation of a Centrally-Directed Economy: Ownership and
Privatization in Hungary During 1990, in Privatization and Entrepreneurship in Post-
Socialist Countries 173, 178 (Bruno Dallago et al. eds., 1992).
10. See, e.g., Balfour & Crise, supra note 3, at 85 ("[P]rivatization will impose
economic hardships on the public which will demand the relief it is accustomed to
receiving from political leadership.").
11. David C. Bangert, Hungary: Exploring New European Management Chal-
lenges, Int'l Stud. of Mgmt. & Org., Vol. 24, No. 1-2, Mar. 22, 1994, at 209, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *2.
12. See Macey & Colombatto, Public Choice, supra note 1, at 389.
13. See, e.g., Mdrton Tardos, Property Relations in the Period of Transition, in
Privatization and Entrepreneurship in Post-Socialist Countries 59, 59 (Bruno Dallago
et al. eds., 1992).
14. Brzezinski, supra note 2, at 1129-30, 1129 n.3 (noting how Communist "non-
competitive" economic systems created a need for competition law); see Stephen S.
Cohen & Andrew Schwartz, The Tunnel at the End of the Light: Privatization in East-
ern Europe, 7 Transnat'l Law. 7, 12-17 (1994); see also George Bogdan, The Economic
and Political Logic of Mass Privatization in Czechoslovakia and Poland, 4 Cardozo J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 43, 43-45 (1996) (noting that, as a result of an extensive history of
centralized planning, post-Communist Eastern European countries "have to recreate
private property and capital markets virtually from scratch"). For a definition of
profit-maximization, see A. Mitchell Polinksy, An Introduction to Law and Econom-
ics 10 (2d ed. 1989).
15. See Brzezinski, supra note 2, at 1130; Campbell, supra note 7, at 346.
16. See Brzezinksi, supra note 2, at 1130.
17. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 3, at 85; see, e.g., Pamela B. Sak & Henry N.
Schiffinan, Bankruptcy Law Reform in Eastern Europe, 28 Int'l Law. 927, 927 (1994)
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transition economy simultaneously pursued the goals of a market
economy and subjected itself to market economy rigors.', Although a
market economy was not firmly established, free market laws which
were no longer completely restrained by the state began to impact
economic actors.19
The first step in establishing a market economy is the creation of
private owners by distributing former state-owned property to the
public.20 Private ownership forms the essence of a free market: with-
out the liberty to own and control property, no voluntary buying and
selling can occur.2 Therefore, by 1992, most CEE nations had either
initiated the privatization of government-held assets or adopted such
plans.22
After privatization, however, additional steps are necessary2 be-
cause countries still lack basic free-market mechanisms that constitute
the market economy infrastructure.24 Western theorists advised that,
in CEE nations, one of these steps was the implementation of an ef-
fective bankruptcy law. Western theory counseled the enactment of
two policies to help prepare for effective bankruptcy laws: first, CEE
nations would release price controls and second, CEE nations would
make their currencies convertible by establishing an exchange rate."
Western advisors, applying the logic of Western markets, then envi-
sioned that CEE nations would need to use the bankruptcy law as the
(noting that CEE nations "formerly had centrally planned economies and decided in
the past few years to adopt new economic systems").
18. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 3, at 87.
19. Id.
20. Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 8-9; see Tardos, supra note 13, at 60 (stat-
ing that "property reform is needed" when establishing a market economy).
21. Tardos, supra note 13, at 64.
22. Ronald A. Cass, The Optimal Pace of Privatization, 13 B.U. Int'l LJ. 413, 415
(1995); Chapter 3 - Progress in Reform (Part 3 of 5), EBRD Ann. Econ. Outlook,
Sept. 1993, at 31, *7 [hereinafter Chapter 3]. Privatization commonly is defined as
"the sale of a state-owned business to parties other than the state." Cass, supra at 415.
23. See Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 7; Stabilization, Reform, and the Role
of External Financing in the Countries in Transition, World Econ. Outlook, May 1994,
at 67, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *15 [hereinafter Stabilization,
Reform] ("To reap the benefits of privatization, it will also be necessary to strengthen
enterprise governance and market incentives in general . . . . [For example,]
[fundamental aspects of commercial law, such as ownership and bankruptcy, must be
clarified.").
24. See infra part I.A-B.
25. Macey & Colombatto, Public Choice, supra note 1, at 392-99; The New
Bohemians, Economist, Oct. 22, 1994, at 23 [hereinafter Bohemians] (analyzing how
the Czech Repubic initiated the privatization process by freeing price controls and
making the currency convertible for trade purposes); see Sanjay Dhar & Marcelo Sel-
owsky, Dealing with the Bad Debt Problem in Transition Economies, Fin. & Dev., Vol.
31, No. 2, June 1994, at 44, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *1
(describing the legacy of nonperforming loans since there have been major shifts in
relative prices due to a "breakdown of trading arrangments under the CMEA (the
former socialist country trading bloc)" and a reduction of government subsidies).
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primary market restructuring mechanism of their economies. 26 In the-
ory, bankruptcy law would restructure markets 7 by taking assets from
insolvent or near-insolvent ("nonviable") enterprises and funneling
the assets to profit-making enterprises.28
Many Western economists advocated, and continue to argue, that
CEE nations should actively use bankruptcy laws. 9 In their view, such
effectiveness implies a healthy market economy.3 ° In an economy
where market competition resounds, some enterprises must fail and
then resort to the bankruptcy law.3 ' Jaromir Cekota of the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development stated, "[i]f you don't
have bankruptcies, this is the economic equivalent of constipation
[which] is bad for the whole organism. '32 One commentator argued
26. Evan D. Flaschen & Timothy B. Desieno, The Development of Insolvency Law
as Part of the Transition from a Centrally Planned to a Market Economy, 26 Int'l Law.
667, 668-69 (1992); David Fondler, Seminar Focuses on Flaws in the Country's Bank-
ruptcy Laws, Prague Post, June 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS
file, at *1 ("[W]ithout bankruptcy, a market economy cannot exist. That's why more
bankruptcies would not necessarily be a problem for the Czech economy."); see Sak &
Schiffman, supra note 17, at 927-29; see also Testimony July 15, 1994, John E. Mc-
Laughlin, Director of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency
Before the Technology and Natl Security Subcomm. of the Joint Economic Comm. of
Congress, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *3 (noting the lack of market mechanisms to
better allocate funds, and thus help the restructuring process); Balfour & Crise, supra
note 3, at 122 (discussing how bankruptcy law closely accompanied the Polish Priva-
tization program); Scott Horton, The Death of Communism and Bankruptcy Reorgan-
ization, 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Apr. 1994, at 12, 12, available in Westlaw, TP-ALL
Library (labelling bankruptcy, in the words of Russian First Deputy Prime Minister
Gaidar, "as the ultimate corrective").
27. For purposes of this Note, the term "market" means a market economy, which
includes specific markets such as a securities market and stock market. See William C.
Philbrick, The Paving of Wall Street in Eastern Europe: Establishing the Legal Infra-
structure for Stock Markets in the Formerly Centrally Planned Economies, 25 Law &
Pol'y Int'l Bus. 565, 565-67 (1994) [hereinafter Philbrick, The Paving].
28. Balfour & Crise, supra note 3, at 85; Horton, supra note 26, at 12; Sak &
Schiffman, supra note 17, at 927; Peggy Simpson, 0 Easy Fix for Ineffective Bank-
ruptcy Laws, Warsaw Bus. J., May 5, 1995, at 7, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NEWS file, at *1-2; see also Chapter 3, supra note 22, at *8 (describing "efficient
resource allocation" as a goal of bankruptcy law). Insolvency may be defined as the
condition when debts exceed assets, but because balance sheets can be "notoriously
inaccurate," a definition can also look at cash flow to see whether debts are paid as
they come due. Id. at *2.
29. Sak & Schiffman, supra note 17, at 927 n.1.
30. See Fondler, supra note 26, at *1; Bankruptcy Takes Hold in Central Europe,
Int'l Trade Fin., Dec. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *1[hereinafter Bankruptcy Takes] ("In the west, bankruptcy plays a permanent but small
role in the economy .... ."); Lidia Sosnowska-Smogorzewska, Bankruptcy Proceedings
Seminar, Unfreezing Liquidation Processes, The Warsaw Voice, May 14, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *1; The Loveliness of Bankruptcy, Econ-
omist, Feb. 18, 1995, at 66 [hereinafter The Loveliness] (describing bankruptcy as "one
way of placing companies in the hands of more effective owners ...
31. See The Loveliness, supra note 30, at 66.
32. Think About It, Chi. Trib., Oct. 11, 1995, at 3 (citing undeveloped bankruptcy
law as one of Slovakia's faults).
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that bankruptcy law's restructuring function was as critical to the suc-
cess of transition economies as other laws that focused more directly
on market-defining financial institutions such as banking regulation,
securities, and commodities laws.33
The use of bankruptcy law, however, has not gone exactly as West-
ern theories would have suggested.3 At this time, CEE bankruptcy
laws have not been utilized substantially on all levels. Governments,
banks, and creditors have been reluctant to initiate bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, and debtors and nonviable enterprises have not sought
bankruptcy law protection.35 The underuse of bankruptcy law in CEE
market restructuring has disturbed Western advisors who have attrib-
uted the underuse to procedural and personnel deficiencies rather
than to substantive defects.36 Although the West and CEE nations
did not anticipate bankruptcy nonuse, this phenomenon should not be
alarming.
Certain Western advisors have misunderstood the post-Communist
context.37 Western criticism of CEE bankruptcy nonuse is based on
the erroneous, implicit assumption that a functional free market struc-
ture exists in the CEE region.3 8 Until CEE nations create an environ-
ment conducive to capitalist behavior, bankruptcy law simply is not
needed as a prominent economic mechanism. Other economic re-
structuring devices have played and will play the role traditionally
played by bankruptcy law.39
This Note argues that despite Western advice, the nonuse of bank-
ruptcy law in CEE transition economies is a healthy phenomenon.
Part I analyzes Western market economists' advocacy of functional
bankruptcy laws in the post-Communist state. Part II describes,
through case studies of the Czech Republic and Hungary, how differ-
33. Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 668.
34. Chapter 3, supra note 22, at *9-10 (recognizing that "there have been few ma-
jor bankruptcy filings to date" and that "most countries have done little to utilise this
[bankruptcy legal] framework"); Milan Zeleny, Economies Cannot Be Shocked Into
Reforms, The Prague Post, Jan. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS
file, at *1; see Anthony V. Raftopol, Note, Russian Roulette: A Theoretical Analysis
of Voucher Privatization in Russia, 11 B.U. Int'l L.J. 435, 478 (1993) ("[In Russia,] the
impact and viability of the new [bankruptcy] regulatory scheme remain untested.");
Bankruptcy Takes, supra note 30, at *1; Dhar & Selowsky, supra note 25, at *5.
35. Bankruptcy Proceedings Are Ineffective in Czech Republiq Say Foreign Ex-
perts, Hospoddrske Noviny, June 1, 1995, at *1 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Proceedings];
Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan Macey, Exchange-Rate Management in Eastern Eu-
rope: A Public-Choice Perspective, 16 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 195, 199 (1996); see Ber-
nard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 1911, 1968 (1996).
36. Bankruptcy Takes, supra note 30, at *1-2.
37. Horton, supra note 26, at 12.
38. Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is
the State Withering Away? 14 (1994) ("The people... have a somewhat ambivalent
attitude towards privatization and market economy as a whole.") [hereinafter
Frydman & Rapaczynski, Privatization].
39. See infra part IV.
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ent privatization paradigms gave rise to different kinds of bankruptcy
law regimes.4n These regimes fall into two general categories: liberal
and stringent bankruptcy laws. Part III illustrates that neither liberal
nor stringent bankruptcy laws have been used substantially. Specifi-
cally, part III determines that culturally, the Communist legacy has
shaped the transition economy's hostile attitude toward bankruptcy
law. Furthermore, part III focuses on the economic aspect of the
Communist legacy which left the CEE region with a horrifying poten-
tial for mass bankruptcies, 41 and presents difficulties specific to a tran-
sition economy that bankruptcy law cannot address. Finally, part IV
explains that bankruptcy law is not necessary at this transitional stage
because other restructuring mechanisms are fulfilling the role of bank-
ruptcy law. Bankruptcy law nonuse does not indicate that a transition
economy is in poor condition. Rather, its absence allows for the nec-
essary gradual restructuring of CEE nations. This Note concludes that
contrary to market theory, CEE nations, constantly moving toward a
Western market economy, did not need to use bankruptcy law and
instead employed other restructuring mechanisms.
I. THE THEoRETICAL BASIS OF THE TRANSITION ECONOMY'S
PURPORTED NEED FOR BANKRUPTCY LAW
Because CEE nations lacked market economy infrastructures after
the demise of Communism, the West enthusiatically recommended
that they immediately implement free market laws such as bankruptcy
law.42 Western advisors, economists, and commentators theorized
that bankruptcy law in the CEE region would serve the same function
as it does in the West: the restructuring of markets through asset-
allocation. 3 This part examines, first, how the Communist legacy left
CEE nations in desparate need of market restructuring, and second,
how in response to this need, Western specialists proposed bankruptcy
laws to serve this role.
40. See infra part II.
41. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 7, at 358 (describing how Russian legislators
feared that a bankruptcy law would cause almost all firms to be declared bankrupt
because of "the poor economic situation and the large amount of inter-enterprise
debt.") Loss-making businesses are estimated to comprise one-third to one-half of
inherited portfolios of large-scale state enterprises in the former eastern bloc. Stilpon
Nestor & Scott Thomas, Privatization Through Liquidation; Economies in Transition;
Industry Overview, OECD Observer, No. 192, Feb. 1995, at 36, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *1.
42. Paul H. Brietzke, Designing the Legal Frameworks for Markets in Eastern Eu-
rope, 7 Transnat'l Law. 35, 38-40 (1994); Daniel T. Ostas & Burt A. Leete, Economic
Analysis of Law as a Guide to Post-Communist Legal Reforms: The Case of Hun-
garian Contract Law, 32 Am. Bus. L.J. 355, 398 n.26 (1995); see Andrei A. Baev, The
Privatization of Land in Russia. Reforms and Impediments, 17 Loy. L.A. Int'l &
Comp. L.J. 1, 33 (1994). The author, a Western-educated professor of law in Russia,
publishing in a American law school journal, urges the Russian government to imple-
ment bankruptcy laws. Id.
43. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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A. The Need for Forced Structuring of the Market
The Communist legacy created the need for a restructuring mecha-
nism, such as bankruptcy law. Despite the fall of Communism, its
negative impact lingers' in CEE economies, especially in the banking
industries and among potential investors.
First, generally, post-Communist CEE nations need to establish co-
operative market institutional links between government, labor, sup-
pliers, manufacturers, and consumers.45 These links did not exist
because, under Communism, there was no need to improve economic
efficiency.46 Under Communism, CEE nations never suffered eco-
nomic instability because the state, as the central macroeconomic ac-
tor, made impossible the very concept of market failure. 7 It avoided
market failure by fixing currency and commodity prices to guarantee
attainment of government-set production goals. Further, the state
served as the chief investor in, and subsidizer of, the economy, sup-
porting inefficient firms and entire industries.4 9 A Communist econ-
omy, particularly with respect to large firms, was integrated both
horizontally and vertically "to facilitate top-down planning, rather
than market competition.15 0 In sum, the state imposed a central eco-
nomic plan which siphoned off profits of successful businesses while
also compensating for the losses of failing businesses. 5'
Second, as a result of Communism, the banking industry requires a
serious overhaul. As the sole owner of all property and any assets of
value, the government through its central plan controlled the banking
system.52 The national banks provided investment capital to indus-
44. See Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 16-24; Stephen Denyer, Introduction
to the Privatisation in Eastern Europe, in Int'l Bus. Law., June 1995, at 242-43.
45. Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 21.
46. Id.
47. See Eastern Metamorphosis Is Radical but Uneven, Investors Chron., available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *2 [hereinafter Eastern Metamorphosis]
("Czech banks are often unwilling to file bankruptcy suits against borrowers since
they do not wish to appear responsible for mass company closures."); Luthans et al.,
supra note 6, at *5. The Communist era 1917-1991, is the second of three distinct eras
of the former Soviet Union. The first era was pre-1917 traditional Russian society;
the third era of post-Communism began in 1991. Id. at *1-2.
48. See Luthans et al., supra note 6, at *5.
49. Horton, supra note 26, at 12; Lin Shoukang, A Monetary Model of a Shortage
Economy, Int'l Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 40, No. 2, June 1993, at 369, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *2. Commentators note that a "(a] very
large proportion of state enterprises simply could not survive without the explicit and
implicit subsidies inherent to central planning." Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at
*1.
50. Brzezinski, supra note 2, at 1129-30 n.7. Horizontal integration refers to the
economic relationships, such as loans, between similar types of firms, such as all man-
ufacturers or all wholesalers. Vertical integration refers to relationships between dis-
similar groups, such as a manufacturer and a wholesaler. See id.
51. See Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 668.
52. Bangert, supra note 11, at *1; Paolo Miurin & Andrea Sommariva, Financial
and Technical Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe: A Critical Appraisal of the
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tries and firms by loaning to them on very favorable terms. 3 If a pro-
ject financed by such loans failed, the banks simply forgave the bad
loans and subsequently reloaned to the borrowers. 4 Such loans were
part of the greater soft budget constraints that demanded no real eco-
nomic bottom line. 5  For example, some enterprises, acting like
banks, extended and forgave commercial credit to other enterprises,
thus forming inter-enterprise credit. 6 "[T]he uncontrolled growth of
inter-enterprise credit in Eastern Europe . . . and the tendency of
banks to continue their lending to state enterprises regardless of their
solvency"57 protected debtor enteTrises which otherwise would not
have been able to make payments.
Third, post-Communist CEE economic actors are not familiar with
basic market theory and have not voluntarily created an efficient free
market. 9 In particular, CEE nations need to develop a "capitalist
ethos" with "a stake in choosing the most efficient allocation of capi-
tal."6 The operation of asset-allocation assumes certain understand-
ings that are not established in CEE nations, such as property and
equity ownership,61 profit-motive, 62 asset valuation, 63 and more gener-
ally, acceptance of market failure.6*
Because of these factors, mere privatization cannot immediately
transform a centrally-planned economy into a democratic free-market
economy.65 In the post-Communist states, private ownership is now
possible, but a class of private owners acting as responsible manage-
ment has not formed .6  Furthermore, even though the government
Role of International Institutions, Washington Q., Vol. 17, No. 3, Summer 1994, at 91,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *3.
53. Miurin & Sommariva, supra note 52, at *3.
54. Making Bankruptcy Work in Central and Eastern Europe, BCD News & Com-
ment, Vol. 28, No. 15, Mar. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at
*2 [hereinafter Making Bankruptcy Work].
55. Macey & Colombatto, supra note 1, at 389.
56. Roman Frydman et al., The Privatization Process in Central Europe 63 (1993)
[hereinafter Frydman et al., Central Europe].
57. Id.
58. Id. at 48 ("As late payments [by debtor enterprises] increased and insolvency
became widespread, enterprises resorted to the so-called inter-enterprise credits.").
59. See Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 12.
60. It. at 12-13.
61. Prepared Statement of the Honorable Ralph R. Johnson Before the Sub-
comm. on Small Business, Federal News Service, May 12, 1994, at 92, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *2; Raftopol, supra note 34, at 438 ("[P]rivate
ownership of the means of industrial production remains a foreign concept in modem
Russia.").
62. See Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 13.
63. Philbrick, The Paving, supra note 27, at 587.
64. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 26, at 31 (noting the Russian fear of bankruptcy
and business failure).
65. Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 11-12. Stephen S. Cohen and Andrew
Schwartz aver that "ownership structure is an important element in modem capital-
ism, but it is only one of many factors that influence corporate behavior." Id. at 15.
66. Zeleny, supra note 34, at *2.
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lifted its price and currency controls, a free market has not arisen.67
Simply, the end of Communism has not led automatically to a func-
tional market economy and thus, CEE market restructuring is
necessary.
B. Configuring Bankruptcy Law in the Post-Communist Context
In the view of Western advisors, bankruptcy law would play a signif-
icant role in restructuring CEE transition economies, and thus in rec-
tifying the problems created by Communism." These advisors
believed that bankruptcy law would serve the same general asset-allo-
cation function in the post-Communist state that it does in the West:
reconciling market scarcity of available assets with the inefficient use
of available assets.69 Thus, asset re-allocation through bankruptcy
laws would maximize market efficiency.70 Consequently, by employ-
ing bankruptcy law, the post-Communist state would prepare the
newly privatized firms for a market economy7' and facilitate the nec-
essary restructuring of the market.'
Western advisors recommended bankruptcy law for four basic rea-
sons. First, bankruptcy law provides a legally predictable mechanism
to deal with failed enterprises, which is necessary because in market
economies enterprises inevitably fail.73 Bankruptcy law prevents the
creditors' race for the debtors' assets by providing equitable and pre-
dictable treatment to similarly situated creditors and employees of in-
solvent enterprises.74 By ensuring predictability, bankruptcy law
improves the amount of information available to investors regarding
the recovery of capital invested in an enterprise that fails.75 Equipped
with this information, creditors are thus able to accurately determine
67. Alan S. Greenspan, Thoughts About the Transitioning Market Economies of
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 6 DePaul Bus. L.J. 1, 11 (1993); see
Frydman & Rapaczynski, Institutional Reform, supra note 2, at 2.
68. Chris Aujard, Central European, Handbook Supplement, 1995 at 13, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *1; Simpson, supra note 28, at *1("[B]ankruptcy 'can't be seen as an economic ill or a way to eliminate the weakest
from the market... but it has to be seen as one of the tools that will lead to adjust-
ment" (quoting Polish Justice Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia)).
69. Balfour & Crise, supra note 3, at 89-90; Julia M. Metzger & Samuel L Bufford,
Exporting United States Bankruptcy Law: The Hungarian Experience, 21 Cal. Bankr.
J. 153, 153 (1993); see Horton, supra note 26, at 31.
70. See Russia: Backs to the Wall, Banker, July 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, NEWS file, at *1 [hereinafter Russia].
71. See Campbell, supra note 7, at 345-46.
72. See Russia, supra note 70, at *1.
73. Campbell, supra note 7, at 345. For a succinct discussion of Max Weber's sod-
ological anaylsis of capitalism, analyzing how the Western concept of law paved cer-
tainty in an uncertain world, see id. at 347-52.
74. Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 669.
75. Id.
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when the value of assets change,76 and accurately compute credit
agreement terms such as collateral requirements and interest rates.77
In this way, bankruptcy law promotes more efficient investment deci-
sions by arming creditors, such as banks and investors, with accurate
financial information.
Second, bankruptcy law exerts pressure on insolvent and inefficient
firms, and promotes the voluntary reallocation of assets.78 Fearing
either potential unemployment as a result of bankruptcy proceedings
or aggressive interference by bank lenders, SOE and former SOE
managers are forced to focus on the financial health of enterprises and
restructure their operations accordingly.79 To increase this pressure
on managers, Western bankruptcy advisors recommended strict bank-
ruptcy provisions that do not leave much discretion to either debtor or
creditor.8" By eliminating the debtor or creditor's ability to forestall
such proceedings, a strict provision imposes a degree of certainty as to
when bankrutpcy proceedings will be initiated, and conveys this cer-
tainty to managers.8" One example, "involuntary bankruptcy," forces
enterprises unwilling to act or acknowledge their financial troubles
into bankruptcy proceedings after a limited grace period.'
Third, bankruptcy law allows debtors to "start anew [and reenter
the market] free of the albatross of debt. '8 3 Bankruptcy law enables
the financially troubled but honest debtor to discharge his enterprise's
obligations after a work-out is arranged.84 No post-bankruptcy mon-
ies earned by the debtor will be subject to prior creditors' claims.85
This allows a post-bankruptcy company to not worry about past debts,
but rather gain new investments and start up a new business venture.8 6
Fourth, bankruptcy law can facilitate privatization. 7 Many SOEs
are heavily indebted or sustain severe losses.' The state could force
these SOEs into immediate bankruptcy proceedings and privatize
*76. "Asset value is determined by the present value of profits that the given assets
may produce. . . ." Tardos, supra note 13, at 59.
77. Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 669.
78. Campbell, supra note 7, at 352, 358.
79. Frydman & Rapaczynski, Privatization, supra note 38, at 127.
80. See Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 679-80.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 680.
83. Campbell, supra note 7, at 346.
84. Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 Tenn. L. Rev.
487, 497 (1996).
85. Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker, Minimizing Risk: Securing a Loan with an An-
ticipated Tax Refund, 13 Bankr. Strategist 3, 4 (1996), available in Westlaw, TP-ALL
Library.
86. Mark A. Frankel, Federal Taxation of Corporate Reorganizations, 66 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 55, 55 (1992); Sak & Schiffman, supra note 17, at 938.
87. Horton, supra note 26, at 12.
88. Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at 36.
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them via the liquidation process.8 9 Through a formal liquidation pro-
ceeding, the equity interest of the government is cancelled or di-
luted.9° New ownership rights are then distributed to major creditors
or the enterprise's work force.91
In reaction to the CEE's crucial need for market restructruing,
Western economists and commentators looked to the theoretical justi-
fications for Western-style bankruptcy law. These justifications led
the West to strongly recommend bankruptcy law in the CEE regions
because it would protect creditors who invest in enterprises, pressure
SOE and former SOE managers to take part in the asset-allocation
process, grant debtors a new life, and faciliate the privatization
process.
II. DIFFERENT TYPES OF BANKRUPTCY LAWS IN PRACTICE
While all models of bankruptcy law ultimately seek to restructure
markets, different models of bankruptcy law exist.9 In serving the
broader goal of restructuring markets, different bankruptcy law mod-
els may address the specific, multitudinous socio-economic needs of
each nation. A nation's legislature can tailor the bankruptcy law by
carefully defining: (1) the event of insolvency/bankruptcy; (2) which
parties can trigger a bankruptcy proceeding; and (3) once triggered,
what protection should be afforded to creditors/debtors. 93
The creation of a particular bankruptcy law regime, as well as the
specifically tailored provisions within such a regime, reflect which so-
cial policies a nation wishes to promote. If a nation wants to promote
investment, particularly Western foreign investment, the bankruptcy
law should be strict.94 Going beyond a "well developed" bankrutpcy
law that seeks to establish predictability for investors, a strict bank-
ruptcy law further bolsters predictability by forcing liquidations,
thereby enabling creditors to quickly retrieve the assets of financially
troubled businesses.95 Further, a strict bankruptcy law allows inves-
tors to understand clearly the ramifications of enterprise failure, and
89. See Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 670 ("[A] business will be so
threatened by financial difficulty that its creditors would prefer to have the business
cease operations, liquidate its assets, and distribute the proceeds of the sales to the
creditors. .. ").
90. See Horton, supra note 26, at 12, 31. The process is done by "breaking a large
business into viable components ... as result of sale or debt-to-equity conversion." I&a
at 31.
91. Horton, supra note 26, at 12, 31.
92. Campbell, supra note 7, at 369-70. A starting point in bankruptcy theory is the
tension between a liberal bankruptcy code, which allows the debtor to avoid or post-
pone debt payments, and a strict bankruptcy code, which forces debtors to honor all
pre-bankruptcy contracts. Id at 370 n.203.
93. Flaschen & DeSineo, supra note 26, at 678-79.
94. Id at 670-71.
95. Campbell, supra note 7, at 379.
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thus encourages foreign investment. 6 If, however, a nation wishes to
promote domestic stability and job security of enterprise employees,
the bankruptcy law should be liberal.97 A liberal bankruptcy law
"permits the debtor to abandon or postpone payment on pre-bank-
ruptcy" debt.98 Further, a liberal law exhibits flexibility, favoring re-
organizations before defaulting to liquidation.99 A reorganization
gives the debtor time to continue to manage the enterprise in the hope
that the debtor can turn the business around.100 During this period,
the debtor can try to attract new investments and also move the assets
from one company venture to another. This approach, however, does
not provide investors with clear information about enterprise success,
failure, or recovery, and thus discourages investment. 10 1 As these
contrasting policies demonstrate, different models of bankruptcy law
reflect different national policies.
Despite this variability in potential bankruptcy laws, Western advi-
sors did not suggest a specific bankruptcy model for each CEE na-
tion.10 2 By the absence of different proposals, the West essentially
proscribed a general bankruptcy law prototype. In practice, however,
all bankruptcy laws that arose in CEE nations were not the same.10 3
Instead, based on their chosen privatization scheme, CEE nations
chose different types of bankruptcy law.1°4
Because CEE nations experienced varying historical and socio-eco-
nomic legacies, they are at varying levels of market economy develop-
ment.10 5 In response to their unique development levels, CEE nations
varied in their approaches to privatization.1°6 Two distinct privatiza-
tion paradigms, the "speed" and "gradualist" paradigm, emerged.0 7
96. Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 670.
97. Id- at 670-71.
98. Campbell, supra note 7, at 379.
99. See Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 670.
100. Horton, supra note 26, at 12. Because of the massive scale of bankruptcy in
Russia, a liberal bankruptcy system is preferred. Id.
101. See Flaschen & DeSieno, supra note 26, at 669-70.
102. See supra notes 26-32, 69-72 and accompanying text.
103. Compare infra part II.A.1 (analyzing the "speed" paradigm of privatization in
the Czech Republic) with infra part II.B.1 (analyzing the "gradual" paradigm of priva-
tization in Hungary).
104. See Cass, supra note 22, at 418-19.
105. See Bogdan, supra note 14, at 45 (distinguishing the historically-influenced dif-
ferences even between the similar mass privatizations between the Czech Republic
and Poland); Cass, supra note 22, at 418-19 n.22.
106. Balfour & Crise, supra note 3, at 6; David Gordon, Privatization in Eastern
Europe: The Polish Experience; Special Section: Privatization, 25 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 517, 522 (1994) ("Each country in Eastern Europe has chosen to approach priva-
tization differently.").
107. This Note uses the terms "speed" and "gradual" paradigm to describe the con-
trasting paces of privatization schemes. See Cass, supra note 22, at 433-34 (praising
the benefits of a "rapid," "quick" privatization); Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at
9-11 (comparing "gradualists and radical capitalists"); Frydman et al., Central Europe,
supra note 56, at 71. According to Harvard Economist Jeffrey Sachs, the paramount
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Each paradigm, along with each nation's very distinct history, engen-
dered different models of bankruptcy law.
Thus, in order to understand why different bankruptcy laws arose
among different CEE nations, one must first look to the varying priva-
tization methods employed by these nations. In particular, this part
examines an example of each of the two privatization paradigms-the
"speed" paradigm's use in the Czech Republic; and the "gradual" par-
adigm's use in Hungary-and analyzes how each paradigm gave rise
to a different bankruptcy law.
A. The "Speed" Paradigm and the Czech Experience
As its name suggests, the "speed" paradigm of privatization stresses
the rapid transfer of state-owned assets to private hands.'03 The ra-
tionale of the speed paradigm was to first relocate all assets to the
private sector as quickly as possible, and then allow the market to
decide which assets, enterprises, and industries are market-worthy and
which are inefficient. 10 9 Under this paradigm, the government does
not restructure, but rather leaves "most restructuring to the new, pri-
vate owners .... [and n]ew legal frameworks and institutions [are
developed] only when the need becomes pressing.""10 Some econo-
mists argue that the speed paradigm represents a "sink or swim"
mentality that values assets most, and places little value on the shell
enterprises or industries that actually hold the assets."'
Under the speed paradigm, one method of privatization is the
voucher system.'12 Under this system, the government makes avail-
able artificial currency to citizens in the form of voucher coupons. n3
These voucher coupons may be utilized to transfer in one of two ways.
Under the first method, private individuals redeem vouchers when
bidding in auctions for shares of SOEs which are to be privatized by
the government.11 4 The second method involves a financial interme-
diary-an investment fund or a holding company, which is managed
either by private individuals or banks." 5  Citizens tender their
policy issue in Eastern Europe is how fast to privatize. Jeffrey Sachs, Accelerating
Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, Paper presented at the World
Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics (Apr. 25-26, 1991), cited in
Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 10.
108. Frydman et al., Central Europe, supra note 56, at 70.
109. See Flaschen & DeSieno, supra note 26. at 671-72.
110. Frydman et al., Central Europe, supra note 56, at 70.
111. Flaschen & DeSieno, supra note 26, at 671-72.
112. Bogdan, supra note 14, at 44 (noting that Russia, the Czech Republic, and
Slovakia enacted voucher privatizations).
113. See Frydman et al., Central Europe, supra note 56, at 86; Philbrick, The Task
of Regulating, supra note 2, at 554.
114. See Bogdan, supra note 14, at 44; Philbrick, The Task of Regulating, supra note
2, at 554.
115. Bogdan, supra note 14, at 44, 52-54; East European Privatisation, Making It
Work, Economist, Mar. 13, 1993, at 90-93 [hereinafter Making It Work].
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voucher coupons to the fund, thereby purchasing shares in the fund
and authorizing fund managers to purchase SOE shares on the indi-
vidual's behalf.116 The investment fund, in turn, uses the voucher cou-
pons to bid on or trade in the shares of the former state-owned
companies." 7
1. The Czech Republic's Relaxed Application of Bankruptcy Law
The Czech Republic employed the speed paradigm, conducting a
highly successful, rapid voucher coupon privatization.' 8 First, the
government, in a series of actions, reduced public spending (including
state subsidies), lifted price controls, made the Czech currency (ko-
runa) convertible for trade purposes and pegged its exchange rate." 9
Next, the crucial voucher system was implemented. The system al-
lowed any citizen to purchase a book of vouchers for the equivalent of
a week's wages. 2 ° In 1990, voucher privatization began with the auc-
tion of small businesses formerly owned by the state.' 2' This stage,
aptly called the "small privatization" program, privatized 100,000 to
120,000 restaurants, shops, and small businesses.1' In April of 1991,
the state then initiated the "large privatization" program, privatizing
midsized and larger SOEs.' 23
Under the Czech bankruptcy regime policy, "the issue of ownership
[was] separable from the issue of restructuring," therefore even after
privatization was completed, restructuring remained incomplete. 24
This exemplifies the correlation between the privatization pace and
the bankruptcy law model: when CEE nations chose mass, rapid
privatization, the application of effective insolvency procedures was
left to the post-privatization stage, so as not to delay the transfer of
ownership.25 Mass-privatization proponents stressed that the issue of
116. See Bogdan, supra note 14, at 52; Philbrick, The Task of Regulating, supra note
2, at 554.
117. See Making It Work, supra note 115, at 90.
118. Bohemians, supra note 25, at 23-24 (recognizing Czech's privatization as a "big
bang" and as a "fast and efficient privatisation programme"); Making it Work, supra
note 115, at 93; Philbrick, The Task of Regulating, supra note 2, at 554; Stabilization,
Reform, supra note 23, at 86.
119. Bohemians, supra note 25, at 23; Luthans et al., supra note 6, at 5. Still, impor-
tant areas of the economy have not been liberalized; for example, rent and most util-
ity prices remain under state control. Bohemians, supra note 25, at 24.
120. Bohemians, supra note 25, at 24. One commentator interestingly noted that
the Czech voucher auctions were "designed to simulate a capital market for SOE
shares." Bogdan, supra note 14, at 44.
121. Bogdan, supra note 14, at 44.
122. Frydman et al., Central Europe, supra note 56, at 77-78 (describing Act 427 of
1990, entitled About the Transfer of State Property and Some Things to Other Legal
or Physical Persons).
123. Il at 79-80.
124. Bogdan, supra note 14, at 47.
125. See Frydman et al., Central Europe, supra note 56, at 63.
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ownership is clearly separable from the issue of restructuring.12 6 In
the Czech Republic, where most enterprises have been mass-priva-
tized without regard to their profitability, liquidation procedures are
"likely to become an increasingly important element of the post-priva-
tization stage of enterprise reform." 127 That is, bankruptcy law is
needed, but at a later stage of market development.
Because this privatization-first, restructuring-second policy was fol-
lowed, the Czech bankruptcy law that was eventually drafted did not
confront specific post-Communist issues. Although the law was
drafted in 1991, the Czech government delayed its application twice
during the first half of the privatization. 128 Furthermore, the 1991
Czech bankruptcy law-the Act on Bankruptcy and Compositions of
Czech and Slovak Republics-was quite routine in the Western
sense.'2 9 The law provides for three kinds of insolvency proceedings:
(1) liquidation (konkurs); (2) compulsory composition (nuceny
vyrovanani), where the debtor can suggest the termination of the
bankruptcy if distribution of the assets cannot be agreed upon; and (3)
composition (byrovanani), which is a voluntary reorganization ar-
rangement between debtors and creditors.'31 Consequently, the
drafted law was generic and did not aggressively seek restructuring
made necessary by the Communist economic legacy. Finally, the
bankruptcy law has not been used in the post-suspension period, and
only recently has the Czech government and its privatization agencies
tried to amend the liberal bankruptcy law.' 31
The Czech Republic's relaxed approach to bankruptcy law directly
correlated to the speed paradigm of privatization. The privatization
process contained "highly centralized aspects, such as the forced pace
of the process and the concentrated power of [privatization] project
approval in the Privatization and Finance Ministries." 132 The state es-
126. Bogdan, supra note 14, at 47.
127. Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at *5.
128. Balfour & Crise, supra note 3, at 101.
129. The bankruptcy law is known as Law Number 32811991. Michael Steiner,
Czech and Slovak Republics: An Introduction to the New Insolvency Law, Turn-
arounds & Workouts Europe, Vol. 4, No. 2, Apr. 1, 1993, at 1. This law predated the
1993 peaceful division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic. IL; see Sak & Schiffman, supra note 17 (comparing Czech, Polish, and Hun-
garian bankruptcy laws; covering definitions, efficiency of administration of the insol-
vency proceedings, stay of collection proceedings against a debtor, degree of finality
of the resolution of claims against debtors, enterprise rehabilitation, avoidance of pre-
bankruptcy transfers, and priorities in distribution of assets); see also Daniel J. Arbess
et al, New Bankruptcy Laws: A Comparison of the Bankruptcy Laws of the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Russia, 1 Parker Sch. J. E. Euro. L. 128, 128-39 (1994) (compar-
ing Czech, Polish, and Russian bankruptcy laws).
130. Steiner, supra note 129, at 6.
131. See Sak & Schiffman, supra note 17, at 944 (stating that, in 1993, the Czech law
was amended to encourage more reorganizations by protecting the debtor for a pe-
riod of three to six months after the filing).
132. Frydman et al., Central Europe, supra note 56, at 80.
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tablished three newly created National Property Funds, which trans-
formed SOEs into joint-stock companies, wholly owned by the state
for a strictly limited period of time (whose shares were then sold to
the Czech public in exchange for vouchers). 33 The Czech govern-
ment exerted considerable control over the privatization. Given that
the Czech government played such a dominant role in the speed priva-
tization process, had it desired a more stringent bankruptcy law re-
gime during the process, it would have likely taken steps to achieve
one.
B. The "Gradual" Paradigm and the Hungarian Experience
The "gradual" paradigm posits that privatization must be moder-
ately paced to thereby enable a post-Communist state to construct a
market economy.'3 Thus, the gradual paradigm of privatization
stands in direct opposition to the speed paradigm. 3 5 Gradual para-
digm proponents believe that a privatization program like the Czech
Republic's, which results in rapid mass ownership of enterprises, does
not guarantee that enterprises will achieve market efficiency.' 36 It is
argued that the speed paradigm does not address the owner restruc-
turing of newly-privatized firms, many of which remain heavily in
debt. Finally, the speed paradigm fails to generate the new capital
necessary to restructure the newly-privatized firms it creates. 137
In contrast, the gradual paradigm slows the speed of privatization
and focuses on restructuring. A gradual privatization targets "enter-
prise restructuring, the creation of credible legal or tax systems, the
rebuilding of a regional network of industrial and market linkages,
and the creation of a functioning, reliable state administration."' 38 In
addition, by not fixating on privatizing, the state can work with owners
of newly-privatized enterprises to coordinate business ventures and
concentrate on improving long-term corporate governance. 139
1. Hungary's Aggressive Attempt to Apply Bankruptcy Law
Like the Czech Republic, Hungary achieved a high level of priva-
tization success. 140 The state's goal was to find "real owners who
133. Id. at 74-75; see notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
134. Bogdan, supra note 14, at 46 (discussing the gradualist argument that capitalist
economies "cannot be created through [mass privatization or "Big Bang"] revolution-
ary policies"); Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 9-10.
135. Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 10-11.
136. Id at 11.
137. See Peter Rutland, Privatization in East Europe: Another Case of Words that
Succeed and Policies that Fail?, 5 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 3 (1995).
138. Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 33.
139. Id. at 31-32.
140. Rachel Wood & t va Talmcsi, Privatisation in Hungary, 23 Int'l Bus. Law 243,
250 (1995). One method of privatization was through ESOPs, employee share owner-
ship programmes, whereby workers could purchase the relevant company's shares. Id.
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[would] work hard to improve efficency and obtain a decent rate of
return on their investment."'' The emphasis was not on speed, but
rather on finding "strategic investors."' 42 Prior to each privatization
project, the Hungarian state transformed the applicable state-owned
firms into new corporate entities.14 3 After this "corporatization,"
Hungary employed direct sales"' and liquidations, and established
joint ventures between the state and private owners. 45 In contrast to
the Czech experience, Hungarian vouchers were used solely as restitu-
tion to those who had owned private property before the Communist
state had communized all land."4 In addition, the privatization was
aided by the early Hungarian economic reforms. In 1989, the Hun-
garian Parliament passed the Act on Transformation.1 47 Pursuant to
this act, in September 1990, Hungary launched the First Privatization
Program designed to privatize twenty large companies either through
competitive tenders or public offerings."
In contrast to the Czech Republic's speed paradigm/voucher sys-
tem, the Hungarian privatization program has been a gradual, "spon-
taneous privatization." It was gradual in terms of pace,1 49 because
Hungary choose not to undergo a rapid, mass privatization.150 It was
spontaneous in terms of control, namely, whether the state exercised
control over the privatization process.' 51 Overall, the state did not
adopt a set of strict privatization rules and primarily left the process
at 248. "In Hungary, a US-assisted ESOPS program has resulted in over 100 major
firms transferring ownership to employees-one of the most successful such programs
in the world." Johnson, supra note 61, at *2.
141. Marer, supra note 9, at 182.
142. Hungary: October 1996, Bus. Intelligence Rep. World of Info., Oct. 1996, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS File, at *19.
143. Marer, supra note 9, at 182-83. A precondition to privatizing a SOE is
corporatization (also known as "full transformation" under the 1989 Transformation
Law). "A part of the SOE may also be corporatized prior to privatization through a
creation of a subsidiary" (known as "partial transformation" under the 1988 Company
Law). Frydman et al., Central Europe, supra note 56, at 131.
144. Technically there are no "direct sales." First, a SOE must be transformed into
a joint-stock company, creating shareowners (owners) and dividing ownership of the
SOE into shares (stocks), whose sale or transfer is the vehicle for changing ownership.
Frydman et al, Central Europe, supra note 56, at 131-33, 140-41.
145. Tardos, supra note 13, at 62-65. SOEs were remade partially or wholly into
Western-style joint stock or limited liability companies. Id. at 62.
146. Cheryl W. Gray et al., Hungarian Legal Reform for the Private Sector, 26 Geo.
Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 293, 308-09 (1992).
147. Marer, supra note 9, at 179-80.
148. Id at 182-83.
149. Wood & Talmcsi, supra note 140, at 245.
150. Philbrick, The Task of Regulating, supra note 2, at 550-51; see also Wood &
Talmncsi, supra note 140, at 244 (discussing Hungary's resistance to mass privatiza-
tion). The Association of Free Democrats, the opposition party to the ruling Socialist
Party, urged a faster speed of privatization, believing that "it was counterproductive
to attach too many conditions and constraints" of prices and sale or transfer terms.
Marer, supra note 9, at 182.
151. See Marer, supra note 9, at 182-83.
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de-centralized. 152 The spontaneity has been described as a "case-by-
case, market-driven approach to transactions."' 53 Similarly, one com-
mentator stated that the Hungarian privatization rules and policies
"must be understood as functioning only as a framework within which
bargaining among individual actors takes place."' 54 This informal ap-
proach stems from the fact that "the initiative to transform and priva-
tize" belonged completely to the head management or "enterprise
councils," '155 which could hold off their enterprise's privatization.15 6
In contrast, during the Czech speed privatization, the Czech govern-
ment jump-started the privatization process by forcing firms to priva-
tize.'57 Even after 1990, when the Hungarian state began to monitor
and regulate privatizations, 58 the predominant pattern of "spontane-
ity" continued.
The gradual paradigm allows restructuring to begin immediately.
Therefore, under this gradual paradigm of privatization, Hungary at-
tempted to institute a more aggressive bankruptcy law regime. Aim-
ing for greater bankruptcy law usage, Hungary changed its initial
bankruptcy law ("First Amended Law"). In Hungary, bankruptcy
laws generally were perceived as "important promoters of industrial
restructuring."' 59 Specifically, the Hungarian government envisioned
that the First Amended Law would be "the central mechanism of con-
flict resolution between banks and enterprises.' 160 Thus, the First
Amended Law would perform "real as well as financial restructuring,"
making surviving firms more competitive in the long run.161 Ulti-
mately, however, this vision of restructuring through bankruptcy law
did not materialize, however, and Hungary subsequently amended the
law a second time ("Second Amended Law").
Early in the privatization process, the amendment of the bank-
ruptcy law was necessitated by the lenient features of the old bank-
ruptcy law.' 62 The old bankruptcy law-the law that preceded the
First Amended Law-was overly flexible; for example, it allowed a
152. Frydman et al., Central Europe, supra note 56, at 138.
153. Wood & Talmcsi, supra note 140, at 244.
154. Frydman et al., Central Europe, supra note 56, at 131. Thus "generalizing
about the process [was] extremely difficult." Id.
155. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
156. Frydman et al., Central Europe, supra note 56, at 130.
157. See infra notes 116-21.
158. Frydman et al., Central Europe, supra note 56, at 130. This regulation was
achieved through the Law on Protection of State Property and the establishment of
the State Property Agency. Id.
159. Gray et al., supra note 146, at 340.
160. Dhar & Selowsky, supra note 25, at *5.
161. Gray et al., supra note 146, at 343.
162. Metzger & Bufford, supra note 69, at 153. The Hungarian bankruptcy law
consists of three substantive sections: (1) a reorganization section based on Chapter
11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code; (2) a liquidation section similar to our chapter 7; and
(3) a corporate dissolution provision rather like that which we have in our state cor-
poration laws. I&a at 154. Currently, only businesses are eligible. Because no signifi-
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reorganization that had been converted into a liquidation to be easily
converted back into a reorganization, thus giving "the debtor and
creditors a second bite at the reorganization apple.'1 63 Further, bank-
ruptcy proceedings could occur only if there was a prior agreement in
the original lending contract between the creditor and debtor. More-
over, the law provided little guidance on how to develop a reorganiza-
tion plan.164 Finally, because creditors had lower priority claims than
employee wage/severance payments under the bankruptcy law's credi-
tor priority schedule, they had less incentive to bring bankruptcy
suits.' 65
In contrast, the revised law, the First Amended Law, was very rigid
in its application of bankruptcy proceedings. 66 First, the First
Amended Law established involuntary proceeding provisons which
required the debtor to file for bankruptcy if it did not satisfy "a very
narrow liquidity test."' 67 The First Amended Law defined insolvency
as the inability of the debtor "to pay a debt within 90 days of the debt
being due.""~ Second, the First Amended Law encouraged enterprise
managers to initiate bankruptcy proceedings by establishing penal
sanctions for managers who failed to report insolvencies. Third, it
strongly favored liquidation over reorganization by requiring unani-
mous creditor acceptance of any reorganization plan. 69 Finally, the
First Amended Law offered creditors a strong incentive to initiate
bankruptcy proceedings, by establishing "rigid time limits on the dif-
ferent stages of the bankruptcy and liquidation process."' 70
Consequently, the gradual paradigm of privatization gave Hungary
the opportunity to attempt to apply an aggressive bankruptcy law.
Because the government and public resources were not devoted solely
cant consumer credit system exists in Hungary, there is no apparent need for a
personal bankruptcy system. Id.
163. Id. at 156. Under Hungarian law, only a reorganization is deemed a "bank-
ruptcy." Id. at 154. A reorganization occurs when "all or part of the business may
remain economically viable, albeit after restructuring the operations or adjusting the
capital structure, and the creditors may wish to have the business continue operations,
agreeing to be repaid on terms somewhat different from the terms of their original
credit contract." Flaschen & DeSieno, supra note 26, at 670.
164. Metzger & Bufford, supra note 69, at 155. The formation of a bankruptcy
workout plan depends on negotiating a consensus among the creditors who may form
one or more committees to deal with a debtor. Id.
165. Gray et al., supra note 146, at 344. This priority of employees over creditors
was a political compromise and international deviation. Id.
166. See id. at 342-43. "The Hungarian bankruptcy law of 1992 was very strict, even
by the standards of established market economies, and was definitely the strictest
among post-communist economies." Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at *4. In ac-
cordance with bankruptcy law, the state adopted new banking laws that are more
vigilant on debt collection. Id
167. Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at *4; see Sak & Schiffman, supra note 17, at
934 (applying a "mandatory filing requirement").
168. Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at *4.
169. Id
170. Gray et al., supra note 146, at 342.
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to privatization, Hungary sought to begin their restructuring process
simultaneously with privatization.
III. THE CEE NONUSE OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
As demonstrated in part II, because the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary enacted contrasting privatization programs, they accordingly im-
plemented contrasting bankruptcy laws.171  Both models of
bankruptcy law had the common goal of restructuring post-Commu-
nist markets. Despite Western forecasts, however, in both cases the
existing bankruptcy law has not been substantially used.172 This non-
use is attributable to both nation-specific reasons as well as general
post-Communist concerns. First, the Czech Republic did not utilize
bankruptcy law because of its speed paradigm of privatization, and
Hungary, although it atttempted to apply an aggressive bankruptcy
law, eventually retracted its law due to the fear of mass bankruptcies.
Second, more generally, the ideal objectives of a Western-style bank-
ruptcy system conflicted with the practical reality of unforgiving CEE
transition economy pressures. 73 In sum, neither model of bankruptcy
law has been able to address the problem endemic to a transition
economy-the gradual restructuring necessary for long-term benefits.
This part discusses the substantial nonuse of bankruptcy law in the
Czech Republic and Hungary.
A. Specific Reasons for Czech Nonuse
Since privatization began in the Czech Republic, very few bank-
ruptcy proceedings have been filed or completed. 74 Both the speed
paradigm and the Czech post-Communist legacy precluded the effec-
tive role of bankruptcy law.
First, under the speed paradigm, the success of privatization held
priority over market restructuring mechanisms. 75 The government
focused its resources on the privatization program and on involving
available economic actors and citizens. The privatization process
aimed toward wide dispersal of assets, 76 creating new classes of indi-
vidual private owners and investment funds. 77 The government fur-
ther ensured wide dispersion by distributing voucher coupons to
171. See supra parts II.A.1 and II.B.1.
172. See Making Bankruptcy Work, supra note 54, at *1; infra part III.C.
173. See Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 669.
174. Bankruptcy Takes, supra note 30, at *1; Chapter 3, supra note 22, at *9-10;
Making Bankruptcy Work, supra note 54, at *1.
175. Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at *4; see also Bogdan, supra note 14, at 47(remarking that the Czech government emphasized "speed and breadth over fiscal
concerns and [restructuring] attention to individual firms").
176. Balfour & Crise, supra note 3, at 94.
177. Rutland, supra note 137, at 11-12.
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citizens. 7 ' In turn, heightened public interest ultimately resulted in
the rapid purchase of SOE shares via coupons.'79
Second, the Czech Republic enjoyed "advantageous historical, geo-
graphical, and cultural proximities to Western Europe"180 and thus,
perhaps could afford to delay restructuring through bankruptcy law.
The Czech Republic was not saddled with enormous foreign debts' s1
and had established far fewer state subsidies, with almost none in the
industrial sector and only a small amount in the agricultural sector.1 2
Compared to the other CEE nations, the Czech Republic also had
stronger political leadership supported by key economic elites charged
with implementing government programs.ls 3
Lastly, the Czech bankruptcy law' s4 did not encourage use by enter-
prises because it failed to encourage financial reorganizations, the
form of bankruptcy law application that is preferred in a transition
economy because of its flexibility.1 s In CEE nations, it has been diffi-
cult to distinguish truly bankrupt firms from struggng firms that have
potential but need economic support at this time.' A reorganization
allows the struggling debtor to continue to control its enterprise for a
set period in the hope that the debtor will be able to turn the enter-
prise around. In stark contrast, a liquidation proceeding removes the
debtor from any management position. In this respect, the Czech
bankruptcy law favored liquidations "regardless of the enterprise's
negative net worth and whether the situation may be remediable."'"
In sum, the Czech Republic did not use bankruptcy law to restruc-
ture because the Czech government was preoccupied with its speed
178. Bogdan, supra note 14, at 44-45; Bohemians, supra note 25, at 24.
179. At first, there was very little public response, but interest grew with the imple-
mentation of private investment funds. The funds solidified public support for the
privatization campaign by giving people an individual stake in the process. See Rut-
land, supra note 137, at 12.
180. Luthans et al., supra note 6, at *6. The Czech Republic appears to be furthest
along in privatization of "the private sector, from less than 1% of GDP in 1989 to
22% by the beginning of 1993, and to 44% by the beginning of 1994." Rutland, supra
note 137, at 11.
181. Bohemians, supra note 25, at 23; Star Czech; Interview with Czech Prime Min-
ister Vaclav Klaus, Chief Executive (U.S.), Sept. 1994, at 26, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, NEWS file, at *1 [hereinafter Star Czech]; see Bogdan, supra note 14, at 45
("Czechoslovakia had a stable economy.").
182. Star Czech, supra note 181, at *4.
183. Id at *1, *5 (discussing the education and experience of the Czech economic
leaders). The Czech market-economy has had a committed elected government with
popular support. Id. at *1.
184. See Sak & Schiffman, supra note 17, at 933-34 (remarking on the similarity
between the Czech and Polish bankruptcy laws).
185. Id at 941; Samuel L. Bufford, What Is Right About Bankruptcy Law and
Wrong About Its Critics, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 829, 836-38 (1994).
186. Instituting Bankruptcy in the Post-Communist Economies of East-Central Eu-
rope, A Colloquium Sponsored by the Institute for EastWest Studies and the Ministry
of Finance of Hungary, Oct. 26-27, 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Instituting Bankruptcy].
187. Sak & Schiffman, supra note 17, at 934.
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privatization program, could suspend such restructuring as a result of
its "strong" CEE economy, and because the bankruptcy law did not
encourage the preferred restructuring method of reorganization.
B. Hungarian Nonuse
Despite its aggressiveness, the Hungarian bankruptcy law, like the
Czech Republic's, has not been substantially used to the degree West-
ern policy-advisors predicted. The Hungarian government believed
that an environment favorable to restructuring through bankruptcy
law existed, and tried unsuccessfully to utilize a bankruptcy law.
Hungary attempted to apply an aggressive bankruptcy law that
would perform a restructuring function. First, because of its gradual
privatization program, Hungary was able to focus on restructuring
more than the Czech Republic.18 Second, just as its liberal market
policies that existed during Communism encouraged Hungary to
privatize, such policies encouraged post-Communist Hungary to begin
restructuring. s9 For example, the development of some state-owned
partnerships under Communism forced the state to make Western-
style calculations of the market value of capital as well as dividends to
be paid on shares.190
In addition, as early as 1984, with the passage of the Law on Enter-
prise Councils,' 9' Hungary began to implement Western-style, self-
management systems in most socialist enterprises. 9 The law estab-
lished "enterprise councils"-for each SOE, a specific group of man-
agement was appointed-for "2000 of the 2800 SOEs and transferred
... ownership rights [in enterprises] to them."' 93 The enterprise coun-
cils in turn encouraged profit-driven behavior. In 1988, Hungary
passed the Company Act which allowed persons to enter into partner-
ships with existing SOEs and with foreign entities, "including busi-
nesses with limited liability whose sole purpose was to make financial
investments.' 94 In addition, the 1990 Law on Entrepreneurship
"abolished most of the remaining restrictions [left over from the Com-
munist era] on operating a small business."' 95
Working on the assumption that restructuring through bankruptcy
law was feasible, Hungary amended their initial bankruptcy law. Dur-
188. Bankruptcy Takes, supra note 30, at *1.
189. Yamnarm, supra note 6, at 185; see Wood & Talmcsi, supra note 140, at 243;
Blaise Szolgyemy, Hungary Still Seen Foreign Capital's Darling in East, Reuter Eur.
Bus. Rep., Jan. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *2.
190. Tardos, supra note 13, at 63.
191. Frydman & Rapaczynski, Privatization, supra note 38, at 103.
192. It has been argued that Hungary actually began privatization in the 1980s.
Chapter 3, supra note 22, at *6.
193. Marer, supra note 9, at 178. The rest of the firms remained in state ownership
exercised by ministry or local municipal capital. Id.
194. aId at 175.
195. Idl
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ing the subsequent period of the First Amended Law, Hungary saw an
enormous increase in initial bankruptcy filings and also privatized
some SOEs through bankruptcy proceedings.' 96 Although not the
preferred option of many CEE nations, Hungary privatized substan-
tially by forcing enterprises into liquidation.' 91 Through this process,
the enterprises were split into smaller, more viable pieces available for
purchase by private investors or funds. 198 Because of these early re-
sults, some over-optimistic commentators called it the only effective
bankruptcy law in the region."9
Ultimately, however, Hungary realized that it had to amend the
First Amended Law because the Hungarian economy was not ready
for a fully effective bankruptcy law. As demonstrated in the next sec-
tion, Hungary saw firsthand the horrifying potential of mass bankrupt-
cies. The First Amended Law was overzealous in its formulation; cit
imposed excessively rigorous financial requirements on debtors,20'
causing an enormous rise in the number of bankruptcy filings.2° The
First Amended law was subsequently amended to "soften the quasi-
automatic triggering of bankruptcy procedures and the liquidation
bias." 3 As a result of the Second Amended Law, the number of
bankruptcy filings significantly dropped.' Thereafter, the degree to
which Hungary utilized bankruptcy law failed to meet the expecta-
tions of Western advisors.
C. Reasons Common to All CEE Nations
Czech and Hungarian bankruptcy nonuse also was due to three fun-
damental reasons shared by all CEE nations. First, the dreadful, eco-
nomic consequences of strictly following bankruptcy law contributed
to bankruptcy law nonuse. Second, legally speaking, a bankruptcy in-
frastructure did not exist. Third, and most importantly, CEE nations
culturally did not understand the concept of bankruptcy law.
196. See Johnson, supra note 61, at *2.
197. Id
198. Id
199. See, e.g., Szolgyemy, supra note 189, at *2 (stating conclusion of economist
Laszlo Csaba).
200. Instituting Bankruptcy, supra note 186, at 5.
201. Id
202. Sak & Schiffman, supra note 17, at 934 n.19; Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41,
at *4. Since the new 1992 bankruptcy legislation, enterprises with aggregate produc-
tion representing close to 10% of GDP have entered insolvency proceedings. Id. The
number of bankruptcies erupted from 528 in 1991 to 14,300 in 1993. Gray et al., supra
note 146, at 349.
203. Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at *4.
204. Hungary: October 1996, supra note 142, at *24.
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1. CEE Economic and Legal Reasons for Nonuse
First, a policy of strict adherence to bankruptcy law by CEE coun-
tries failed to address the special needs of the region and threatened
to bring too many enterprises into bankruptcy without giving them a
chance to succeed.211 Thus, the general fear of mass or inter-enter-
prise insolvency within CEE nations remained.0 6 Mass insolvency
was feared especially in the Czech Republic with its many newly-
privatized market enterprises and in Hungary, where the Communist
era left many bad loans. In Hungary, the systemic problems of enter-
prise insolvency posed the potential to affect thirty to fifty percent of
the economy.2 0 7 Notably, since 1990, Hungary attempted three times
to bail out debt-ridden banks, "[b]ut this has not brought stability." 08
Furthermore, the Hungarian government remained reluctantly in con-
trol of the big banks and the majority of their assets.20 9 Because of
these links, the same debt affected multiple enterprises and banks,
thus forming inter-enterprise debt 10 and posing a potential crisis if an
overly aggressive bankuptcy law forced liquidations. 211 The conse-
quences of mass enterprise bankruptcies in both CEE nations would
be disastrous, resulting in extensive unemployment,1 2 and potentially,
social unrest.
213
Second, bankruptcy infrastructure was lacking in CEE nations. In
both the public and private sectors, the administrative system was ill-
equipped to deal with the volume of insolvent enterprises.214 In addi-
tion, the judicial system lacked experienced judges and qualified liqui-
dation or reorganization trustees who would administer the
bankruptcy proceedings.21 5 Judges and trustees lacked market experi-
205. Dhar & Selowsky, supra note 25, at *5.
206. Bankruptcy Takes, supra note 30, at *1. The massive filing following the first
amendment of the Hungarian Law was the most important single reason for the fall in
GDP by three percent to five percent in 1992. Instituting Bankruptcy, supra note 186,
at 5.
207. Gray et al., supra note 146, at 345.
208. Eastern Metamorphosis, supra note 47, at *2.
209. Id.
210. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
211. See Richard W. Stevenson, In New Economy, Russians Cannot Rely on Their
Banks, N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 12, 1995, at Al, A10 (discussing how in August of 1995, the
entire Russian banking industry underwent a crisis as banks halted the inter-bank
market, which banks rely on to keep their operations going).
212. Campbell, supra note 7, at 391 ("[I]t is possible that mass unemployment due
to a strict bankruptcy code may result in a popular uprising sufficient to end the Yelt-
sin government's reforms"); Flaschen & DeSieno, supra note 26, at 672.
213. Campbell, supra note 7, at 391; Flaschen & DeSieno, supra note 26, at 672.
The Russian government feared "mass layoffs and the political fallout that could re-
suit from the closing of insolvent enterprises." Mikhail Dubik, State Prepares Major
Bankrupt List, Moscow Times, June 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NEWS file, at *1.
214. Dubik, supra note 213, at *1.
215. Sak & Schiffnan, supra note 17, at 944-45; Bankruptcy Proceedings, supra note
35, at *1.
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ence and a sense of social responsibility, and often were not motivated
to protect debtors and satisfy creditors to the extent necessary to in-
still confidence. 16 Thus, CEE countries were unable, even if they so
desired, to effectively use the bankruptcy system.
2. Cultural-Economic Bankruptcy
Most importantly, CEE nations did not understand the concept of
bankruptcy law.217 In order to understand bankruptcy law, nations
must understand market failure, and CEE nations did not.218 A socio-
cultural fear of bankruptcy pervaded the CEE region, with a bankrupt
party likened to a criminal.2 19 Thus, although bankruptcy law is, in
theory, a necessary partner of market restructuring, in CEE practice,
bankruptcy law represents Western cultural norms and policies that
CEE nations are unwilling to embrace 20
First, because post-Communist economic actors did not aggressively
seek profits,1-1 they were not motivated to recognize market ineffi-
ciency312 An ability to recognize market inefficiency and incentives
to economize resources is imperative to the use of bankruptcy law.223
This inability in CEE nations also formed a vicious cycle: transition
economy enterprises generally were unable to collect adequate mar-
ket information because of the "accumulation of outstanding unpaid,
non-performing credit;"'' z this inability severely distorted information
about the market;2 and completing the cycle, the distortion further
hampered enterprises in their efforts to collect data.
Second, creditors and debtors viewed bankruptcy law in a negative
light, disbelieving its purpose, and thus did not seek to use it. Credi-
tors, including banks, did not "have an interest in seeing the enter-
prises go bankrupt, because if the companies [were still around, they
[would] at least pay some interest on their loans.' 'z Bankruptcy pro-
ceedings failed to procure for banks any return on their investments.
216. Bankruptcy Proceedings, supra note 35, at *1.
217. See Aujard, supra note 68, at *1.
218. See Steven L. Seebach, Bankruptcy Behind the Great Wall. Should U.S. Busi-
nesses Seeking to Invest in the Emerging Chinese Market Be Wary?, 8 Transnat'l Law.
351, 354 (1995).
219. Bankruptcy Proceedings, supra note 35, at *2.
220. See infra part M.C.2.
221. Tardos, supra note 13, at 59 ("[D]uring the transition from the socialist econ-
omy to a market economy there are no true proprietors behind real assets and firms
who would have any vital interest in expected profit.").
222. Mary M. Shirley, The Wha4 Why, and How of Privatization: A World Bank
Perspective, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S23, S27 (1992).
223. See Cass, supra note 22, at 420-21.
224. Russia, supra note 70, at *1.
225. Id
226. David Rocks, Czechs Spared the Bite of Unemployment, S.F. Chron., Feb. 22,
1995, at 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *1 (quoting Richard
Falbr, chairman of the Czech-Moravian Chamber of Trades Union, the Czech Repub-
lic's largest labor organization).
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This lax attitude toward enforcing bankruptcy was reinforced by the
absence of liquid stock markets which would have enabled the owner-
ship of privatized firms to change hands.227 On the debtor end, em-
ployees and management in debtor or nonviable enterprises did not
understand bankruptcy protection. Instead, such salaried parties tried
"to get as much out of the company as they [could] before it [went]
out of business."" 8 In the Czech Republic, this threat translated into
increased wages and perks.229 Thus, both creditors and debtors
delayed filings for bankruptcy. The state "support[ed] bail-outs for
large companies in trouble and . . . discourag[ed] the calling in of
debts. 230
Third, the state feared the political and social consequences of
bankruptcy, and because they controlled many of the largest banks
and companies, they were able to avoid bankruptcy. The state owned
fifty percent or more of many of the largest banks and companies,
with the remaining share distributed to many small shareholders.23'
The state viewed bankruptcies as leading to unemployment. The ex-
ploding economic effect of an enterprise's bankruptcy would be espe-
cially catastrophic on the local level, with the loss of several thousand
jobs. 232 Retraining and relocating such a group would be extremely
difficult from the state's perspective.3
Such attitudes continue to dissuade CEE actors from using bank-
ruptcy law. Economic actors are unable to discern market ineffi-
ciency, creditors and debtors are not encouraged to resort to
bankruptcy protection, and the state still in control of too much of the
"private" market sphere fears the unemployment consequences of
bankruptcy.
IV. FILLING BANKRUPTCY LAW'S VOID
Predictions that bankruptcy law would play a major role in CEE
nations' shift to a market economy led to the inverse idea that bank-
ruptcy nonuse is a warning sign of macroeconomic problems.2- This
assumption, which may hold true in Western market economies,z "
does not explain the post-Communist situation. In CEE nations, a
trade-off resulted between the type of bankruptcy law that was imple-
mented and the adoption of a mass, rapid privatization or a gradualist
program.236
227. Stabilization, Reform, supra note 23, at *7.
228. Zeleny, supra note 34, at *2.
229. Id.
230. See Bohemians, supra note 25, at *4.
231. Rocks, supra note 226, at *3.
232. Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 672.
233. Ia
234. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
235. Id.
236. Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at *5.
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Aggressive use of bankruptcy law is not necessary in CEE transition
economies because other devices, peculiar to this environment, have
assumed the restructuring role traditionally played by bankruptcy law.
The result appears to be that most companies can be effectively re-
structured without bankruptcy law application. 37 This part will ana-
lyze how domestic restructuring mechanisms and foreign investment
have played the restructuring role of bankruptcy law.
A. Domestic Restructuring Mechanisms
To avoid bankruptcy proceedings, CEE governments have turned to
various devices. Specifically, CEE governments have improved
creditworthiness and contained inflation, thereby avoiding the need
for bankruptcy use, through the use of three principal debt-restructur-
ing methods. All three methods work as an incentive to restructure
and maximize capital-use efficiency.
Under the first method, CEE nations attempted a traditional "sys-
temic" approach-encourage bankers and borrowers to work out as
much bad debt-where payment was unlikely-as possible.2-a Once
bad debt was identified, it was cut out of banks' portfolios or recapi-
talized 239 through an autonomous public entity set up to accept the
non-performing loans.24 These loans were then settled through direct
negotiations or evenutally through the use of bankruptcy proceedings.
This systemic approach assumes that the risk of the collapse in the
financial sector far outweighs banks growing accustomed to being
bailed out in this manner.241
Instead of aggressive bankruptcy use, both the Czech Republic and
Hungarian governments have implemented this traditional systemic
approach.24 2 In the Czech Republic, consolidation banks were estab-
lished in 1991. Using these consolidation banks, the government as-
sumed the bulk of bad loans from the nation's quasi-public
commercial banks, and re-capitalized the bad loans with five-year gov-
ernment bonds. In 1992, the second round of Czech bank re-capitali-
zation occured, with the National Property Fund ("NPF") assuming
the bad loans.3 In Hungary, the Hungarian Investment and Devel-
237. See generally Stabilization, Reform, supra note 23, at 90, 99.
238. Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at *3.
239. For a concise explanation of programs that seek to write off bad debts or to
recapitalize debts, see Chapter 3, supra note 22, at *12.
240. Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at *3.
241. Id
242. Id The problem of the traditional approach is that it leaves large portfolios of
bad loans in public or recently privatize enterprises in the hands of public entities who
effectively are in charge of pushing for financial restructuring or bankruptcy. Id.
243. Several schemes also were enacted to work out inter-enterprise debts with
very little success due to the lack of clear incentives-the plan was voluntary. Id.
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opment Bank assumed most of the bad debt from commercial banks'
balance sheets, replacing it with twenty-year treasury bonds.2
Under the second method, "centralization," the CEE government
channelled aid to certain SOEs, thereby preparing these enterprises
for privatization and for a competitive market environment." 4 By
first evaluating enterprises' business plans and competitive strate-
gies,' 46 the state selected SOEs which were most likely to advance
national economic development and were therefore most deserving of
scarce government funds.2 47 Under a modified centralization method,
the government also established liquidation or restructuring agencies
to manage a preselected number of the most distressed, insolvent
post-privatization enterprises. 248
Under this approach, bankruptcy law purposely was circumvented.
Some whole industry sectors were exempt from bankruptcy to achieve
financial stability and ensure social stabilization. 9 For example, mo-
nopolized and essential industries were principal sources of employ-
ment,2 0 particularly in areas outside the capital cities.25' The state
also did not want to get "rid of"-i.e., privatize-all enterprises be-
cause certain, valuable enterprises provided a source of revenues.252
The third method was "pre-privatization" restructuring, which was
minimally used in the Czech Republic and Hungary. In the Czech
Republic, the NPF carried out pre-privatization restructuring of some
large enterprises, reworking their balance sheets253 that had been dis-
torted under Communism. In Hungary, "apart from the 100 compa-
nies participating in a debt consolidation programme, another 160
very large companies (with a value of more than $10 billion) have
been transferred to the State Holding Company which is responsible
244. Id
245. See Campbell, supra note 7, at 381 (discussing how the Russian bankruptcy law
explicitly allows for state subsidies to shield certain firms "from the realities of a mar-
ket economy").
246. Alice H. Amsden, Eastern Europe: Putting Some Government Back in Manu-
facturing, 98 Mass. Inst. of Technology Alumni Assoc. Technology Rev., No. 5, July
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *5. The government can favor
enterprises that are willing to devote a certain percentage of their output to a particu-
lar product line or meeting a quality level by a specified year, or export given qualities
of goods to selected countries. Id. at *5-6.
247. See Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 672. Evan Flaschen and Timothy B.
Desieno examine the legacy of the socialist system and advises which aspects of it are
worthy of preservation.
248. Dhar & Selowsky, supra note 25, at *3.
249. Bankruptcy Takes, supra note 30, at *2.
250. Campbell, supra note 7, at 389-90.
251. Amsden, supra note 246, at *1.
252. Cf. Frydman & Rapaczynski, Institutional Reform, supra note 2, at *6 (stating
that preservation of valuable enterprises is an important goal for policymakers consid-
ering privatization).
253. Nestor & Thomas, supra note 41, at *2.
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for their pre-privatisation restructuring (which includes financial
support). '' 4
Planting the socio-cultural seeds of a native capitalist class is neces-
sary; 5 each of these three methods have helped restructure by en-
couraging capitalist behavior. After four decades of Communist
mismanagement, certain ingrained attitudes remained .256 There has
been a need to create a driving force of private ownership, and to
develop "the informal codes of behavior-including managerial and
business practices-which underpin the working of all effective [mar-
ket economy] institutions."25s The government, private investors,
managers, and the general citizenry must learn to utilize assets in the
most efficient way and steer these assets towards profit-generating
entities 58s
For example, to motivate labor, some CEE governments have sold
state enterprises to enterprise workers.5 9 Further, CEE governments
established management programs which financially disciplined man-
agers by linking their compensation to their enterprise's value.2 In
addition, in Hungary, to foster capitalist entrepreneurship, financial
recommendations have been made to construct a network of small
financial intermediaries, such as commercial banks, to provide small
businesses with special bonds or credit pools for start-up capital and
credit.261 The government would support this network by acting as a
guarantor for commercial loans.? 2
254. Id. at *3; see Star Czech, supra note 181, at *5.
255. See Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 16-22 (noting the ability of state
institutions and policies to address the shortage of entrepreneurial experience and
poor work habits of labor). Some argue that to privatize firms "without first restruc-
turing them may undermine the creation of a competitive environment, since ques-
tions of competitive structure and effective corporate governance need to be settled
before privatization takes place. Otherwise, the new private owners will resist any
belated attempt to correct for market failures." Zeleny, supra note 34, at *2.
256. See Burton Bollag, Walking the Line...; Western Business Concepts and Com-
munism in the Czech Republic, Across the Board, July 1995, at 37, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *1, *3.
257. Zeleny, supra note 34, at *2.
258. See Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 26, at 671 (noting the theory that "assets
themselves, rather than the particular business that utilizes the assets, produce eco-
nomic value and employment").
259. Kent Klaudt, Hungary After the Revolution: Privatization, Economic Ideology
and the False Promise of the Free Market, 13 Law & Ineq. J. 303, 362-64 (1995); see
also Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim, Corporate Goverance in Transition Economies,
32 Fin. & Dev. 20, Sept. 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *1
(noting that "the privatization process has resulted in strong insider control-by man-
agers in some cases, and by managers and workers in others").
260. Dhar & Selowksy, supra note 25, at *4; see Tardos, supra note 13, at 63 (draw-
ing up an incentive program where the firm would pay bonuses for carefully specified
tasks).
261. Marer, supra note 9, at 177.
262. Id.
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B. Foreign Investment
Foreign investment also helped to provide both the investment capi-
tal and impetus to begin the restructuring of the private sector.263 In-
dustrial shares in insider-controlled enterprises were unattractive to
potential domestic investors264 because of low dividends and the vir-
tual impossibility of obtaining a large block of shares in a particular
enterprise. Consequently, the domestic equity market tended to be
weak and incapable of providing adequate finance for enterprise re-
structuring.265 Foreign investment in CEE nations, acquired through
sales by tender and international private placements of shares with a
domestic public offering,266 helped to bring in needed capital-both
equity and liquid capital. Further, foreign investment assists in or-
ganizing capital, technology, and management skills.267
The restructuring process in CEE nations through foreign invest-
ment has been underway. All of the CEE nations have made their
economies more receptive to foreign investment and moreover, im-
proved their framework of laws regarding foreign investment. 268 By
the end of 1993, the amount of foreign investment had risen to almost
$10 billion.269 In both the Czech Republic and Hungary, foreign in-
vestment has helped to begin the long restructuring process in their
economies. The Czech government has relied on investments from
foreign institutions for debt financing and for capital improvements. 70
Hungary has made foreign investment "a basic element of its eco-
nomic growth and privatization strategy" and has successfully at-
tracted foreign investment.27' It has received an enormous amount of
foreign investment, with "[f]oreign direct investment beg[inning] to
flow into Hungary in amounts equal to, and sometimes greater than,
the rest of the region put together."2" In 1993, Hungarian firms with
263. See Zeleny, supra note 34, at *2. "New wealth is imperative. Redistribution of
the old wealth is insufficient." Id.; see also Donald J. Hasfurther, Prospects for Busi-
ness with East Europe, 549 PLI/Comm. 189, 196 (1990), available in Westlaw, TP-ALL
Library ("All of the countries... have placed a heavy emphasis of foreign investment
as a mechanism for stimulating economic growth .... "). Contra Tardos, supra note 13,
at 66 (warning CEE nations against sales to foreign investors unless such sales reduce
the foreign debt).
264. Amsden, supra note 246, at 2.
265. See id.
266. Wood & Talmicsi, supra note 140, at 244-45.
267. See Cheryl W. Gray & Wiflliam W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign
Direct Investment. The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 1, 5 (1995).
268. Id. at 3.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 6.
271. Hasfurther, supra note 263, at 193.
272. The Knife is Turned, Banker, Vol. 146, No. 839, Jan. 1996, at 42, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file, at *1.
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over ten percent foreign ownership accounted for half of all new
investment.273
CONCLUSION
CEE nations are not ready for bankruptcy law restructuring. Mar-
ket economy infrastructure as well as incentives-to recognize the
need for correcting market inefficiency and distortion through bank-
ruptcy law application, and to understand the bankruptcy law's reha-
bilitative impact as well as its sense of equitable justice-do not exist.
At this point, CEE nations cannot afford to comply strictly with
Western-style bankruptcy laws. Because of their post-Communist leg-
acies, it is difficult to differentiate between a temporary, short-term
financial crisis and a doomed business.274 Insolvency law should only
allow the former, a presumably viable firm, to continue in business.'
CEE transition economies need extensive economic restructuring,
particularly of the equity and capital markets, and must actively seek
to inculcate new "market" attitudes in potential domestic investors.
Western predictions of pervasive bankruptcy law use in CEE rested
on market assumptions that did not exist.
As evidenced in the Czech Republic and Hungary, bankruptcy non-
use, at this time, is a positive sign of gradual restructuring. When the
economy is ready for a fully-effective bankruptcy law, part of the
learning process then will be to teach CEE nations that bankruptcy is
a positive tool to salvage businesses and jobs.2 76
273. Id. at *4.
274. Instituting Bankruptcy, supra note 186, at 3.
275. Sak & Schiffman, supra note 17, at 931.
276. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 26, at *12 (focusing on Russia as an example of
post-Communist nations).
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